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the front, and offer this opportunity for them to occupy these
chairs.
The next address was to have been given by Dean Henry M.
Bates of the College of Law of the University of Michigan. Mr.
Bates wired at the last moment that unforeseen circumstances
absolutely prevented his presence here this morning, but he
very generously sent a substitute who will deliver an address.
He also is a member of the faculty of the College of Law of the
University of Michigan. I take great pleasure in introducing
Professor Edson R. Sunderland of Ann Arbor, Michigan, who
will deliver an address on Preventive Justice.
Professor Sunderland: Mr. President; Members of the
Iowa State Bar Association: Some of you, who have long memo
ries, will perhaps recall the old testament story of Jacob, who
left his father's home and went off to a far country, and there
found Laban's daughter Rachel standing by a well drawing
water for her father's flocks. Jacob fell in love with Rachel, and
sought her for his wife, and Laban said he could have her for
his wife if he worked seven years for her. So Jacob worked
seven years for Rachel, but he did not get Rachel ; he got Leah
as a substitute, and then he had to work seven years more to
get Rachel.
Now, I think that the world has always bestowed most of its
sympathy upon Jacob, but I have always had a feeling that
fully as much sympathy ought to have been given to Leah.
The position that I find myself in to-day recalls that story very
vividly, and reinforces my view that Leah was the real victim,
and I hope to-day, while you are feeling sorry for yourselves
because you are not getting the paper from Dean Bates, which
you expected, you will drop an extra tear for the substitute.
The subject as announced on the program is Preventive
Justice, but I have altered it a little to read, Preventive Justice
Through Declaratory Relief.
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DECLARATORY RELIEF
Under the British Finance Act of 1910, the Commissioners of
PROFESSOR EDSOX R. SUNDERLAND
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Internal Revenue sent out several million financial question
naires to persons resident in England, demanding certain items
of information. The Act provided a penalty for refusal to
answer questions asked by the Commissioners, and a notice sent
out with each questionnaire referred to this penalty. Some of
the recipients of these questionnaires doubted the authority of
the Commissioners, under the Act, to demand the information
sought, and proceeded to apply to the courts for declarations
that they were not bound to answer the questions. Actions were
brought for this purpose against the Attorney General. The
most famous of these were the two cases of Dyson v. Attorney
General. (1910) 1 K. B. 410; and (1912) 1 Ch. 158.
Counsel for the defendant vigorously asserted the impropriety
of such a proceeding. They contended that "if an action of
this kind will lie against the Crown there will be innumerable
other actions for declarations as to the meaning of numerous
other acts of Parliament which impose a penalty, thus adding
greatly to the labors of the law officers." They asserted that
"the plaintiff has no right to ask for a declaration that he is
not under any obligations to comply with this notice. The plain
tiff may have a good defense if the Attorney General proceeds
by information to recover the penalty, but he has no right to
bring an action of this kind ; it is turning the procedure upside
down. ' '
But the Court of Appeal refused to recognize the validity of
any of these objections. Farwell, L. J., in the first Dyson Case,
said :
It is obviously- a question of the greatest importance ; more than eight
millions of Form IV (the form on which the information was required to
be given) have been sent out in England and the questions asked entail
much trouble and in many cases considerable expense in answering; it
would be a blot on our system of law and procedure if there is no way by
which a decision on the true limit of the power of inquisition vested in
the Commissioners can be obtained by any member of the public aggrieved,
without putting himself in the invidious position of being sued for a
penalty. . . .) The next argument on the Attorney General's behalf was
"ab inconvenient*" ; it was said that if an action of this sort would lie
there would be innumerable actions for declarations as to the meaning of
numerous Acts, adding greatly to the labors of the law officers. But the
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Court is not bound to make declaratory orders and would refuse to do so
unless in proper cases, and would punish with costs persons who might
bring unnecessary actions; there is no substance in the apprehension, but
if inconvenience is a legitimate consideration at all, the convenience in the
public interest is all in favor of providing a speedy and easy access to
the Courts for any of His Majesty's subjects who have any real cause of
complaint against the exercise of statutory powers by Government depart
ments and Government officials having regard to their growing tendency
to claim the right to act without regard to legal principles and without
appeal to any Court. ... If ministerial responsibilities were more than
the mere shadow of a name, the matter would be less important, but as
it is, the Courts are the only defense of the liberty of the subject against
departmental aggression.
In the second Dyson Case, Fletcher - Moulton, L. J., said :
I think that an action thus framed is the most convenient method of
enabling the subject to test the justifiability of proceedings on the part
of permanent officials purporting to act under statutory provisions. Such
questions are growing more and more important, and I can think of no
more suitable or adequate procedure for challenging the legality of such
proceedings. It would be intolerable that millions of the public should
have to choose between giving information to the Commissioners which
they have no right to demand and incurring a severe penalty. There must
be some way in which the validity of the threats of the Commissioners can
be tested by those who are subjected to them before they render them
selves liable to a penalty; and I can conceive of no more convenient mode
of doing so than by such an action as this.
And the Master of the Rolls added:
I am a little surprised that the Commissioners do not welcome a decision
which will guide their action in the future. Their contention that no
Court should interfere unless and until a penalty is sued for seems ex
travagant.
These cases illustrate in a striking way the scope and purpose
of the practice of making declaratory judgments and decrees.
It is something which may well form the dominant theme of any
practical discussion of modern methods of preventive justice.
It is probably, though unfortunately, typical of the American
Bar that so old and so common and so useful a procedure has
remained so long unknown as a general remedy, in this country.
We have not been much interested in new methods. After the
intense but short-lived reformatory effort which produced the
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code system of pleading, the American legal profession settled
down to use what it had, and to be satisfied with things as they
were, and it is remarkable how little change in procedure the
last half century has witnessed. But the crude period of
American life is passing and the impatient spirit of the frontier,
which was too busy reaping fabulous returns from its enterprize
to bother much with refinements of method, is giving place to
a more serious and thoughtful attitude toward the means where
by a complex society can meet the legitimate and growing de
mands which its members are making upon it.
The declaratory judgment has come down from the Roman
Law, and in continental Europe during the Middle Ages, ques
tions of status, of property rights, of the validity or invalidity
of wills and other documents were common subjects for judicial
declarations. (The Declaratory Judgment, by Borchard, 28
Yale Law Journal pp. 10-13). In France there are several
familiar forms of declaratory relief, and in Germany this remedy
has been very widely employed. (Id. pp. 15-20).
It has been used in Scotland for nearly four hundred years
(1849, Law Magazine p. 179), under the name of "declarator,"
by means of which a very extensive field was open for declara
tory relief. (Yale Law Journal, supra, pp. 21-24). And in
England the courts have been constantly engaged in granting
declarations of rights under the present rules for about forty
years. A more limited declaratory judgment act was in force
for thirty years prior thereto.
The present rule, put into force in 1883, as Rule 5 of Order
25, is as follows:
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that
a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court
may make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief
is or could be claimed or not.
The extent of the innovation upon the orthodox conceptions
of the common law produced by this rule, is obvious. The com
mon law, on both its legal and equitable side, was wedded to the
idea of a wrongful act on somebody's part as a necessary con
dition precedent to judicial action.
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Thus Holland, speaking of remedial rights, or rights of re
course to courts of justice, says :
The causes, or "investitive facts" of remedial rights are always in
fringements of antecedents rights. (Jurisprudence, Ed. 9, p. 310).
And again, he says:
So long as all goes well, the action of the law is dormant. When the
balance of justice is disturbed by wrongdoing, or even by a threat of it,
the law intervenes to restore, as far as possible, the status quo ante. (Id.
p. 306).
Salmond expresses the same view as to the function of courts
and the conditions under which they may be used by litigants.
He says:
Both in civil and in criminal proceedings there is a wrong (actual or
threatened) complained of. For the law will not enforce a right except
as against a person who has already violated it, or who has at the least
already shown an intention of doing so. Justice is administered only
against wrongdoers, in act or in intent. (Jurisprudence, p. 71).
This crude theory of the common law is wholly abandoned
under the declaratory judgment rule. A wrongful act is no
longer necessary to secure judicial action. Rights as well as
wrongs become the concern of the courts. Even where coercive
relief might be had, it is very common to ask for a mere declara
tion of rights. Every case may by this means become, in ap
pearance at least, a friendly suit. There is no doubt that the
personal animosities developed by litigation are serious draw
backs to the usefulness of the courts. To sue is to fight, and
fights make endless feuds. Parties hesitate to resort to the
courts because they shrink from a state of war with their
neighbors or business associates. But if the courts could operate
as diplomatic instead of belligerent agencies, less hesitation
would be felt over recourse to them, and less strain would be
put upon the friendly relations of the parties.
But the rule authorizes declarations of rights where no con
sequential relief could be asked for. In so far as it does this
it not only authorizes a new method of procedure but creates a
new class of causes of action. It gives one the right to know
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his rights—something exceedingly novel to American lawyers.
Since ignorance of the law excuses no one, the law will furnish
an oracle to declare it. Assuming that the parties wish to do
right, the law will authoritatively point out the way to go. The
field which the new practice opens is a wide and fruitful one. It
furnishes remedies which no civilized country ought to deny to
its citizens, and the lack of them is a serious hardship in this
country.
The practice of making declarations of right has completely
revolutionized English remedial law. The American lawyer
who peruses the current English reports is bewildered by their
novelty. He is like a modern Rip Van Winkle, who, having
gone to sleep in an age when courts were only the nemesis of
wrongdoers, awakens to find that they have become the guard
ians and advisers of those who respect the law.
Outside of the few states which have adopted the new prac
tice, the only recourse of an American who wishes to get a
forecast of his rights is to consult his lawyer. But the lawyer's
opinion is without the slightest binding force. Vast interests
may be at stake, but all the client can do is to gamble on the
sagacity of his counsel.
In England such compulsory gambling has been abandoned.
The client consults his lawyer, the lawyer, in case of doubt,
frames a case for the court, and the court, on a full hearing
with all interested parties before it, makes a final and binding
declaration on which the client can act with perfect security.
The practice is so convenient and so obviously advantageous that
it has become almost a matter of course in English chancery
cases and is very common on the law side of the court. An ex
amination of a typical volume of Chancery reports shows that
out of sixty-four cases reported, forty-three were brought for
declarations of rights. It would be safe to say that approximate
ly two-thirds of the current Chancery litigation in the Supreme
Court of Judicature is directed to obtaining the advice of the
court as to rights of litigant parties, with or without prayers
for consequential relief.
The cases in the volume of chancery reports above mentioned
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will illustrate the nature and range of questions put to the court
for determination. Thus, in Lovesy v. Palmer, (1916) 2 Ch.
233, plaintiff asked for a declaration that certain memoranda
and letters constituted a binding contract between the defend
ants and the plaintiff to make a lease of a theatre. In Smith,
Coney & Barrett v. Becker, Gray & Company, (1916) 2 Ch. 86,
the plaintiffs asked for declarations that certain contracts which
they had made with defendants were illegal by reason of the
proclamation of a state of war between Great Britain and Ger
many. In re Lodwig, (1916) 2 Ch. 26, the plaintiff asked the
court to declare whether certain trusts were void for remoteness.
In re New Chinese Antimony Company, Lim., (1916) 2 Ch. 115,
the liquidator of a company asked the court to determine and
declare the correlative rights of the preferred and common
shareholders in the assets of the company. In re Chafer and
Randall's Contract, (1916) 2 Ch. 8, plaintiff asked a declaration
that the abstract of title delivered by the defendant to the plain
tiff did not show a good title. In Cassel v. Inglis, (1916) 2 Ch.
211, plaintiff asked the court to declare that he had been illegal
ly excluded from membership in the Stock Exchange. In Cole
man v. London County and Westminster Bank, Lim., (1916) 2
Ch. 353, the court was asked to decide the question of priorities
in certain debentures as between the plaintiff and defendant.
In Parsons v. Equitable Investment Company, Lim., (1916) 2
Ch. 527, the court was asked to declare that a certain bill of sale
was void because it failed to state truly the consideration for
which it was given. In Pearce v. Bulteel, (1916) 2 Ch. 544, a
declaration was asked as to who were the owners of certain
property. In Gilbert v. Gosport and Alverstoke Urban District
Council, (1916) 2 Ch. 587, plaintiff asked the court to declare
that he owned certain land free of any public right of way. In
a majority of the above cases there was a present cause of action
in the plaintiff, which was either utilized as the basis for a claim
for relief in addition to the declaration of rights, or was aban
doned in favor of the declaration as a better remedy.
Declarations have been made as to whether contemplated
action by a corporation would be ultra vires, Cyclists' Touring
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 87
Club v. Hopkinson, (1909) 191 L. T. 848; as to whether a con
tract was dissolved by declaration of war, Burns v. Siemens
Bros., (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 21; as to whether a lessee of property
had certain asserted rights under a lease, In re Dott's Lease,
(1920) 89 L. J. Ch. 15; as to the rights of a claimant under a
will at the end of a period which has not yet expired, Austen
v. Collins, (1886) 54 L. T. 903; as to an agent's rights to com
missions not yet earned, Powell v. Evans Jones & Co., (1905)
1 K. B. 11; as to whether a vendor, offering certain property
for sale, can convey a clear title, Re Burroughs - Fowler, (1916)
2 Ch. 251, Re Traffords Settled Estates, (1915), 1 Ch. 9; as to
whether a lessor's refusal to consent to the assignment of a lease
was unreasonable, Jenkins v. Price, (1907) 2 Ch. 229; as to the
law of England relative to priorities between mortgagees and
necessaries men in a ship, for use in a French court which had
jurisdiction of the ship, The Manor, (1903) P. 95; and in al
most countless other cases.
It is quite obvious, I think, from even this cursory survey of
the practice, that it opens great possibilities of usefulness to
society. And its value has been so far appreciated as to bring
about the enactment of statutes in six states authorizing declara
tory relief. New Jersey passed the first act in 1915, but it was
limited to equitable actions. (L. 1915, Ch. 116). Michigan
passed the first general statute authorizing the practice both at
law and in chancery, in 1919 (Act 150), and Wisconsin passed
a somewhat narrower act the same year (L. 1919, Ch. 242).
Florida passed an act like that of New Jersey, in 1919 (No.
75), and New York passed a very broad act in 1920 (Civ. Pro.
Act, Sec. 473). The last states to enact declaratory judgment
statutes have been Kansas, which substantially adopted the
Michigan Act, about three months ago, and California, at its
last legislative session. And the Massachusetts Judicature Com
mission, in its report issued last winter, urged a declaratory
judgment act for that state (Mass. Law Quar., Jan. 1921, p.
113).
There are, however, two problems connected with the practice
which arise in the United States, but which are not fully pre
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sented in England. Both relate to our constitutions. They
may be stated thus:
1. Is the determination and declaration of rights a judicial
function, to be exercised by courts under our constitutional
division of functions between the executive, legislative and judi
cial departments?
2. Does the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury apply
to suits for declaration of rights?
The first of these questions was raised by the Supreme Court
of Michigan on its own motion in the case of Anway v. Grand
Rapids Ry. Co., (1920) 211 Mich. 592, and answered in the
negative. The case was similar to the Dyson Cases already re
ferred to. A statute restricted the number of consecutive work
ing days allowed to street railway employees, and a penalty
was provided for violation of the act. There was doubt as to
whether it applied to voluntary agreements between employees
and employer, and the plaintiff asked for a declaration that he
was free to contract for a larger number of consecutive work
ing days than the act named, if he wished so to do. The Circuit
Court gave the declaration asked, but the Supreme Court re
versed the case on the ground that inasmuch as no wrongful act
had yet been committed, the question was a moot one, and the
court had no judicial power to pass upon it. This, of course,
cut the entire foundation from under the act, and made a con
stitutional amendment necessary to give it validity.
The court was not harmonious in its decision, for two judges
dissented, arguing, with more convincing logic, more breadth
of research, and a keener understanding of the duties of courts
as servants of organized society, that the declaratory judgment
act merely generalized a kind of remedy which has been gradu
ally creeping into our jurisprudence and which in its less con
spicuous forms has been repeatedly recognized as a proper ex
ercise of the judicial function.
A few of the instances where the principle of the declaratory
judgment has been employed in special statutes will illustrate
how readily we have fallen into the practice without knowing
it. Many states have statutes providing for the determination
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of heirs, without an order of distribution. This is a declaratory
judgment, and no question has ever been raised as to the judicial
nature of such a proceeding. In 18 Corpus Juris p. 876, it is
said that:
Although tinder the Michigan statutes, an order declaring certain per
sons to be heirs of a decedent is simply prima facie evidence of the facts
found, and is not conclusive on anybody, in most states where proceedings
of this nature are provided for, the judgment, order, or decree is binding
and conclusive on the parties before the court, and, on collateral attack,
is entitled to the favorable presumptions accorded judgments generally.
The declaratory nature and purpose of these statutes is ob
vious. Another common statutory provision for a declaratory
judgment is the proceeding for confirming the validity of bonds
proposed to be issued by irrigation districts. The first Act of
this kind was passed in California in 1889. In People v. Linda
Vista Irrigation District, 128 Cal. 477, the court affirmed the
constitutionality of the Act, in the face of a dictum of the
United States Supreme Court in Tregea v. Modesto Irr. Dist.,
164 U. S. 179, that a decision as to the validity of bonds not yet
issued would involve a moot question.
In Nampa etc. Irrigation District v. Brose, 11 Idaho 474, the
objection was made that the judgment could not be sustained
because the proceeding was commenced before any bonds were
issued. But the court said there was nothing in that contention,
because "it was the evident purpose and intent of the legislature
that the validity of such bonds should be determined before they
were actually issued," so as to enable them to bring a better
price.
Acts of this kind have been in full operation in many of the
western states for many years and although every conceivable
objection has been raised to their validity, they have invariably
been held valid. Anderson v. Grand Valley Irr. Dist., 35 Colo.
525; Progressive Irr. Dist. v. Anderson, 19 Idaho 504; Lund-
berg v. Green River Irr. Dist., 40 Utah 83; Horn v. Shaffer,
47 Utah 55 ; Alfalfa Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411.
The only judicial criticism ever made as to the constitution
ality of these acts, by way of dictum in the Tregea Case, supra,
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appears, from the recent volume of Rose's Notes on the United
States Reports, published in 1919, never to have been approved
or followed in any subsequent decision, state or federal.
Another example of a declaratory judgment provided for by
statute is found in Wisconsin statutes, sec. 2352, providing that
whenever the validity of a marriage was denied or doubted by
either party, the other party might commence an action to af
firm the marriage, and "the judgment in such action shall de
clare such marriage valid or annul the same, and be conclusive
upon all persons concerned." See Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167
Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 792.
In Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, an attack was made on
the validity of the Torrens Law, on the ground that it clothed
the courts with powers which were administrative rather than
judicial. The court said:
The contention is further made in this connection, that judicial power
can be exercised only to settle existing disputes and controversies, and that,
if none exist, the act of merely describing and declaring an undisputed
title is necessarily administrative and cannot be performed by the judicial
department. This argument does not fully meet the case. It may be
admitted that the existence of controversies which could not be settled by
the interested parties, and the necessity of some other means of determin
ing such controversies, were the primal causes for the institution of courts
with power to adjudge between the parties to the strife, and, consequently,
that originally the exercise of judicial power implied the existence of an
actual present controversy to be determined. But the refinements of
civilized life, and the necessity for the orderly regulation, determination,
and protection of human affairs and rights of property, have long re
quired the extension of the judicial power beyond the settlement of con
troversies which have actually arisen, so as to include the function of pro
viding security against disputes and claims which may arise. Hence, in
modern times the power of the courts may be, and often is, exerted to
protect property and rights from possible, though at the time unknown,
hostile claims and pretensions, or merely to declare a status, or a right,
and thereby to forestall and prevent controversies which, but for the
judicial declaration, might arise in the course of future transactions or
proceedings .... At the time the constitution was adopted this class of
powers had long been usually exercised by the courts alone. It must be
presumed that in providing therein for the division of governmental power
into three departments, legislative, executive and judicial, and declaring
that no person charged with the exercise of the powers belonging to one
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of them should exercise functions appertaining to either of the others,
this usual power of the courts was in mind, and that it was intended that
the courts should continue to exercise these quasi-judicial powers, as they
had previously been accustomed to do. A law which merely creates a new
occasion and provides a new procedure for the exercise of this power,
cannot be said to transgress this clause of the constitution.
A special statute authorizing courts to declare the rights of
parties in land was passed in California after the great earth
quake of April, 1906. The public records were largely destroyed,
and the Act provided for the bringing of an action by anyone
to establish his title and determine all adverse claims to the
property, in case the records were destroyed. It was provided
that the judgment given "shall ascertain and determine all the
estate, rights, title, interests and claims in and to said property,
. . . and shall be binding and conclusive upon every person who
at the commencement of the action had or claimed any estate,
right, title or interest in or to said property. ..."
The above statute came before the Supreme Court of Califor
nia in Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150
Cal. 289, and it was urged, among other things, that the action
provided by this statute was not a judicial but an administra
tive proceeding, and was not in accord with the constitutional
division of government powers. The ground urged for this
objection was that the court acted upon a mere assertion of the
petitioner's right, without any allegation that such right was
assailed or disputed by anyone, and that in such cases the de
cree rendered was a mere declaration of right. The court held
the objection untenable.
A large and growing class of cases, which in recent years has
come frequently before the Supreme Court of the United States,
falls precisely within the domain of declaratory judgments,
but has been so cleverly concealed under familiar fictions as to
escape ready identification. I refer to suits by stockholders
against corporations, to enjoin the payment of taxes. Brushaber
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 10, was such a case. The
real defendant was the United States government, but it was
not formally made a party and no relief was asked against it.
However, the government actually appeared in the guise of an
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amicus curiae and took part in the suit, under the tacit under
standing that the decision of the case would be considered as
fixing the rights of the government in the premises.
Now, this was in substance a suit for a declaration. The in
junction feature was largely fictitious. In order to get the
question of the validity of the tax law before the court the
plaintiff pretended that he and the corporation were at odds
over the duty to pay, and that unless restrained, the corporation
would divert funds for this purpose. The real party defendant
was not present at all, because the United States Revised Stat
utes, Sec. 3224, provided that "no suit for the purpose of re
straining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be main
tained in any court." The contention that the case as actually
litigated presented a meritorious controversy involving the
validity of the tax law, would be absurd. The interests of the
plaintiff and the defendant were identical, and the whole pro
ceeding was an effort to make an inadequate remedy serve a
purpose for which it was not adapted. The injunction was as
fictitious an element as the lease, entry and ouster, in the old
action of ejectment. It was merely a case where the lack of a
direct method of getting a declaration of rights forced the
parties to use an ingenious artifice.
The recent report of the Massachusetts Judicature Commis
sion, in recommending the enactment of a declaratory judg
ment act for that State, says:
In Massachusetts certain limited forms of declaratory judgments have
long been in common use, although not known by that description. The
most obvious example of it is the registration of title to land. In other
words, the Land Court was created in 1898 for the primary purpose of
"declaring" title to land. Still older forms are the common bills for in
structions by trustees and others for the interpretation of written in
struments and bills in equity to quiet title. Probably if our statutes were
thoroughly analyzed a considerable number of varied forms of the applica
tion of the idea involved in a declaratory judgment would be found under
differently described proceedings, such, for instance, as the proceeding by
which a wife may obtain a decree declaring her right to live apart from
her husband without interference, and her right to convey and deal with
her own property for justifiable cause. But the more general application
of the idea is not available to-day in Massachusetts, in many ways in
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which it might be used to great advantage in commercial and other cases
in which there is now no method of obtaining a binding declaration of
rights and duties in actual controversy, if no technical violation of right
or duty has occurred, and cannot, perhaps, occur without serious risk of
loss to one party or the other. Mass Law Quar. Jan. 1921, p. 114.
One point in connection with the practice of declaring rights
should be emphasized. It has nothing in common with the prac
tice provided for in a few States, whereby the executive or
legislative department of the State may call upon the Supreme
Court for its opinion upon important questions of law, or where
by the court may render judgment in advance upon the legality
of proposed municipal action. The difficulty with this procedure
is that the court does not have the benefit of argument by in
terested parties, nor is it able to gauge the effect of a decision
disassociated from the saving restrictions of a concrete case.
The declaratory judgment is always the result of an actually
litigated concrete controversy between parties who represent
every interest involved and are actually before the court.
In spite, therefore, of the views of the majority of the court
in the Anway Case that the making of binding declarations of
rights is not the exercise of a judicial function, it is very un
likely that the English and Scotch courts, in making such
declarations for so many generations, were mistaken in the
notion that they were acting in a judicial capacity, and it is
equally hard to believe that all these instances of American
declaratory relief represent a mistaken view of the nature of
the judicial function.
As to the second constitutional question, involving the right
of trial by jury, it is probable that declaratory relief which
operates in conjunction with, or in place of, well recognized
legal remedies, should be deemed legal and carry with it the
right of trial by jury. If, however, such declaratory relief is
asked in conjunction with, or in substitution for, remedies clear
ly equitable, it should be deemed equitable, and free from the
requirement of the jury trial. In such cases the mere request
for a declaration should not alter the nature of the proceeding.
But when we have a case where no legal or equitable relief
of the ordinary type is possible, because there is no conventional
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cause of action in existence, and the only relief to be had is a
declaration, it is not so clear what character the proceeding
should be deemed to assume. Every historical reason would,
however, support the idea that such cases should not be deemed
legal, but rather equitable. The rigidity of the common law
in matters of remedy was notorious, and equity came into exist
ence to make the courts more responsive to social conditions.
Practically the whole task of developing new remedial agencies
was taken over by the courts of chancery, which were given
general jurisdiction over all matters of Grace. 1 Pomeroy Eq.
Juris. (3rd Ed.) Sec. 34. And in performing this task the
chancellors felt bound by no English precedents but drew freely
from the reservoirs of the Roman Law. Id. Sec. 20. Their duty
was to mitigate the rigors and supplement the deficiencies of
the Common Law, Karnes's Eq., Intro, pp. 12, 15, and the most
universal test of their jurisdiction was the absence of an ad
equate and plain remedy at law. 1 Story's Eq. Juris. (14th
Ed.) Sec. 33. This theory of the function of courts of equity
has never been abandoned, and is to-day as vitally operative
as it ever was. 1 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (3rd Ed.) Sec. 67.
A declaration is a form of relief very similar to several
varieties of familiar equitable relief. Its purpose is to anti
cipate and prevent trouble, in which it resembles the injunction.
Its effect is to establish rights by judicial decree, in which it
closely resembles a decree quieting title. In fact, an action for
a declaration might well be viewed as the broadest form of an
action to quiet title, taking the term "title" in the very general
sense of "claim" or "interest," in which it is used in pleading.
A decree quieting title is nothing but a declaration of rights in
land; a declaration of rights under a contract or statute is in
principle a quieting of the plaintiff's title to do what he asserts
a right to do under it.
Courts of equity have not assumed to entertain bills for the
construction of contracts, written instruments, ordinances or
statutes. But in principle the construction of a contract or a
statute is exactly the same thing as the construction of a will,
and if any of them are considered to be equitable proceedings,
all should be held to be such.
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Considerable light is thrown on this question by some recent
cases in New Jersey. In that State an act was passed in 1915
authorizing any person claiming a right, cognizable in a court
of equity, under a will or other instrument to apply to the court
for a construction thereof and for a declaration of the rights
of the parties interested. In New Jersey, the equitable juris
diction to construe a will has never been recognized.
In 1917, in Re Ungaro, 88 N. J. Eq. 25, a bill was filed under
this statute to construe a will and declare the rights of the
parties interested. The objection was made that the case was
improperly brought, for the statute limited such declarations
to rights "cognizable in a court of equity," and no right to
construe a will and make a declaration had ever been recognized
in New Jersey. But the court said:
At first blush it might seem that the words "cognizable in a court of
equity" were intended to limit the court to construction of an instrument
in the class of cases in which the jurisdiction of the court was then assert
ed, which, in the case of a will, would only be to construe it incidentally
to affording some relief between the parties. If this be the meaning of
the act it would be merely a declaratory statute. But there is no need of
passing a declaratory act on the subject, there being no doubt about the
jurisdiction or its limitations. . . .
Instead of being declaratory, I think the statute in question was meant
to be remedial—that is, to extend the remedy of construction to cases
where there exists no present right to relief resulting from construction.
The fact that so many cases have been brought for construction where no
relief was available and the suitors were turned away, seems to indicate
a situation where construction without relief was a right much desired and
one which might be extended with propriety. And the legislature seems
to have taken this view.
In the still later case of Mayor, etc. of the City of Bayonne
v. East Jersey Water Co., (N. J. 1919) 108 Atl. 121, the city
asked for a declaration of its rights against the defendant water
company under certain written contracts. Specifically, one of
the questions involved in the declaration asked was whether the
water company was under any obligation to furnish the city of
Bayonne with water after June 21, 1929. In other words, the
city asked for a declaration as to what rights it would have
under the contract ten years in the future. This clearly was
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wholly outside of any possible action by any court under the
former law or equity practice, but the court had no hesitation
in holding that the case was ' ' very clearly within the provisions
of section 7 of the Chancery Act of 1915," which was the act
authorizing declarations of rights cognizable in a court of
equity.
Another close analogy to declaratory relief is found in the
equitable jurisdiction over trusts, wherein equity courts enter
tain applications from trustees for instructions as to their duties
in respect to the trust estate.
In the leading Illinois case of Ward v. Farivell, 97 111. 593,
where the constitutionality of a statute allowing a receiver of
an insurance company to file a bill to assess stockholders was
attacked because it did not provide for a jury trial, the court
said:
The right of a court of equity to pass upon questions of this kind does
not depend upon the fact that the cause of action was one of equitable
cognizance prior to the adoption of the existing constitution. It is suf
ficient if it is one in fact, without regard to when it became so or was
first recognized by the courts as such. It is a fact well understood by all
who are familiar with the history of courts of equity that their jurisdiction
from the earliest times to the present, has been of a gradual and constant
growth. Originally, the subjects over which they assumed jurisdiction
were comparatively few; but in process of time, they gradually increased
to an almost indefinite extent. Nor is it important whether this gradual
growth in their jurisdiction is attributable to direct legislation or to the
enlarged views of the eminent chancellors who have presided over and shed
so much lustre upon those courts. It is sufficient if the subject-matter of
the suit is one of equitable cognizance, without regard to when it first be
came so or was recognized as such; and in all such cases, except where
some statute has otherwise expressly provided, the court may, if it thinks
proper to do so, pass upon all questions of fact involved in the controversy
without the intervention of a jury. . . . The constitutional provisions we
have just cited were designed simply to secure the right of trial by jury
in all tribunals exercising common law jurisdiction as it had theretofore
been enjoyed. It was not intended to confer the right in any class of
cases where it had not previously existed.
Such then, briefly considered, are the chief features and
problems of the declaratory judgment, a remedy offering the
most comprehensive form of preventive justice yet devised. The
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remedy is one which will strongly appeal to the public if it
can have the matter intelligibly brought to its attention. The
present writer happened to be the draftsman of the Michigan
Declaratory Judgment Act, which suffered so sad a fate at the
hands of the Supreme Court of that State, and had the pleasant
experience of a two-hour discussion of the act before the joint
judiciary committees of the House and the Senate, while the
Act was before the legislature; and the intense interest mani
fested by every member present in the usefulness of the pro
posed remedy, demonstrated clearly how eager the public is to
substitute common sense for technicalities in the administration
of the law.
The President: Do you know, I think that Jacob was an
exceedingly unwise young man to pay any further attention to
Kachel after he got Leah.
I am satisfied that we are going to have a very interesting
discussion of the report of the Committee on Law Reform after
luncheon. I know that the Committee has given the matter
considerable study, and I exhort you to be present at two o'clock
to hear the report of the Committee and to enjoy the discussion
this afternoon. We will now adjourn.
Afternoon Session, June 23, 1921.
2 O'CLOCK
The President: Gentlemen, you will please come to order.
I want to suggest at the outset this afternoon that the ac-
coustic properties of this room are not perfect, and I want to
warn the speakers to raise their voices. Complaint was made
this morning that it was quite impossible to hear in the back
of the room.
I want to make another suggestion, that the social bee at the
rear of the room should be curtailed as much as possible, and I
think those doors should be kept closed.
This afternoon is to be devoted to the report of the Committee
on Law Reform.
